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NOTES
TORTS: SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF EXISTING
REMEDIES FOR IMPROPER DEBT COLLECTION
ACTIVITY
Collection activity as a natural adjunct of a credit-fed economy must
be recognized as an area of continuous growth and fluctuation. That
creditors are entitled to pursue extrajudicially the collection of out-
standing debts cannot be argued, since cost and time factors often
weigh heavily against resort to formal court action.1 However, it is
equally clear that creditors' extrajudicial efforts cannot be given un-
bridled license at the expense of legitimate rights of debtors.2 That
courts have long recognized a need for protecting debtors from over-
zealous collection activities is evidenced by a large aggregate of de-
cisions in the reports, often referred to as the "rough collection" cases.
1. One creditor in his letter to the debtor's employer stated: "Now there are
two ways open to us to enforce collection. One way is to take the debtor to court;
this involves a loss of time and additional court costs, to which naturally we do
not like to resort unless absolutely compelled. The other method which we prefer
is to appeal to a man in authority like yourself." Keating v. Conviser, 127 Misc.
531, 532, 217 N.Y. Supp. 117 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
2. Justice Smith of the Michigan Supreme Court candidly points out the
questions which arise as a result of creditors engaging in extrajudicial methods
of collecting their debts. He states:
The problem presented in the collection cases is considerably older than
the theory upon which recovery is here sought [right of privacy] ...
How far may a creditor go in the collection of his debt? The time is not long
distant when imprisonment for debt was commonplace. It has been said...
that during the period of its employment, until around 1830, from 3 to 5
times as many persons were imprisoned for debt as for crime, and most of
the sums involved were, as in the case before us, very small. The wave of
reform which abolished such practices has resulted, with few exceptions, in
the abolition of the criminal sanction. The civil remedies, of course, remain,
at the other extreme. But between the 2 poles is a vast shadowland of
doubt and uncertainty. How far may a creditor, for the purpose of collecting
his debt, go in exposing his debtor to public contempt and humiliation? How
much extra-legal pressure may be applied? May he go to the debtor's
pastor, to his employer, to his neighbors, to all whose esteem is important,
to those forming the inner circle of his spiritual defenses, and expose the
debtor's alleged disregard of his obligations? May the creditor, to them,
complain that the debtor owes him $21.98 and has doggedly refused to
pay although "he has been given every reasonable opportunity to pay or
make satisfactory arrangements"? That he is, in short, either a deadbeat,
or broke, or both?
Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau Inc., 345 Mich. 500, 514, 76 N.W.2d 835,
841-42 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
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Debtors have sought redress in the bulk of these cases through use of
traditional, well established tort theories which often prove inadequate
or outmoded when applied to today's expanding repertoire of collection
techniques. This note will analyze and evaluate the various legal
theories upon which creditors have been held civilly liable for overly
aggressive and illegal collection methods which fall short of assault
and battery3 Particular attention will be devoted to the scope of these
theories and to the more common fact situations in which there ap-
pears to be overlap in application.
ABUSE OF PROCESS
The action of abuse of process lies when legally issued process is
used for some purpose other than that which it was designed by law
to accomplish. The essential elements of this tort are some ulterior
purpose plus a wrongful, improper use of the process. 4 In contrast to
the action of malicious prosecution, which lies when factually un-
supportable prosecution occurs,, abuse of process requires neither
termination in favor of plaintiff, nor a lack of probable cause on the
part of defendant.6 The conduct upon which liability is founded occurs
after the process is issued 7 and there need be no showing of malice in
having the process issued.8 An additional requirement that the de-
fendant must benefit or the plaintiff suffer injury as a result of the
improper use was held essential by one court.9
The cases in which creditors have been held liable on the theory of
3. There are several criminal theories which have been used to punish creditors
for various collection methods. If a creditor furtively takes goods of the debtor
as payment of a just debt, the essentials of larceny are present. Gettinger v.
State, 13 Neb. 308, 14 N.W. 403 (1882). If, however, money equal to the debt is
openly taken in the belief that the owner would not object, then there is no
larceny. See Perkins, Criminal Law 229 (1957). It is not robbery to collect
payment of a valid debt by force, although it may well be a statutory felony,
common law misdemeanor, or common assault. Ibid. The forceful taking of
property to satisfy an uncertain, unliquidated, or non-bona fide debt is robbery.
Ibid. One can also be guilty of blackmail though he honestly believes the money
is justly owed. State v. Richards, 97 Wash. 587, 167 Pac. 47 (1917). Particular
attention should be paid to the various criminal extortion statutes. See Clark v.
Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Perkins, Criminal
Law 326 (1957).
4. Prosser, Torts § 100, at 668-69 (2d ed. 1955) (hereinafter cited as Prosser).
5. Id. at 667.
6. Id. at 668.
7. Id. at 668-69. Since imposition of liability for abuse of process is aimed
at protecting the integrity of the judicial machinery, the production of evidence
which proves improper use of legally issued process seems essential. See Restate-
ment, Torts § 682 (1938).
8. Prosser § 100, at 668.
9. Gore v. Gorman's, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (interpreting
Kansas law).
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abuse of process fall generally into three categories :o (1) institution
of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff;"l (2) seizure of the
plaintiff's person in a civil action ;12 and (3) seizure of the plaintiff's
property by an appropriate writ.1 3 In each of these situations the
collateral purpose of having the process issued is to collect the debt-a
purpose which approaches extortion14 since payment is sought not in
the action instituted, but ancillary to such action. As a result of such
conduct, a debtor may recover for any humiliation, indignity, damage
to his reputation, or other legally compensable harm which he suffers. 10
In the typical factual situation in which an abuse of process occurs,
a creditor causes a warrant to be issued for the debtor's arrest (upon
grounds which probably exist so as to avoid liability for malicious
prosecution)17 or will procure a writ to attach property which the
debtor needs in his vocation. Then the warrant or writ is presented
to the debtor with advice that there is a "way out" ;18 if the debtor
pays he will not be arrested or his property will not be attached, but
failure to pay will result in arrest and prosecution or attachment of
the property. A finding of his guilt in a criminal action does not pre-
clude the debtor from bringing an action of abuse of process if he
establishes improper use of the process, i.e., negotiating for payment
of the debt after the process' issuance.1 9
It is highly improbable that creditors will frequently resort to this
10. Note, 16 N.C.L. Rev. 277, 280-81 (1938).
11. E.g., in McClenny v. Inverarity, 80 Kan. 569, 103 Pac. 82 (1909), the
debtor was arrested for taking mortgaged property from the county and was
released upon payment of $250, the actual debt being only $145.
12. E.g., in Lockhart v. Bear, 117 N.C. 298, 23 S.E. 484 (1895), the creditor,
to collect a disputed debt, made an affidavit alleging that the debtor in an attempt
to defraud his creditors was about to leave the state. The debtor refused to pay
and creditor then sued out writ of arrest and bail.
13. E.g., in Mullins v. Matthews, 122 Ga. 286, 50 S.E. 101 (1905), the tenant's
furniture was seized under color of distress warrant to coerce payment of
disputed rent.
14. See McClenny v. Inverarity, 80 Kan. 569, 103 Pac. 82 (1909), where the
court stated: "The evidence disclosed the fact that a warrant for the arrest of the
plaintiff upon a criminal charge was used to collect a debt, and, it seems, to
extort an additional amount." Id. at 571, 103 Pac. at 83.
15. See Prosser § 100, at 669.
16. For a discussion of damages in abuse of process actions see McGann v.
Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 184, 134 Atl. 810, 813 (1926).
17. See Prosser § 100, at 667-68.
18. The debtor was so advised in McClenny v. Inverarity, 80 Kan. at 572, 103
Pac. at 83, supra note 14.
19. In Ledford v. Smith, 212 N.C. 447, 193 S.E. 722 (1937), liability was
imposed even though no evidence was adduced which showed improper use after
the criminal proceedings had begun. The case has been criticized on this point.
See Note, 16 N.C.L. Rev., supra note 10, at 278 n.2.
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means of collecting debts because of the danger of incurring liability
for malicious prosecution, and also because there are seldom grounds
for issuance of process except the debt itself. An action for abuse of
process will not lie when a debtor is merely threatened with litigation
and no process is actually issued or improperly used. Furthermore,
improper use cannot be established by malice alone2 0 and this often
protects a creditor from liability. It can be readily seen that because
of these limitations abuse of process is frequently an inadequate rem-
edy when applied to collection cases.
DEFAMATION
Broadly defined, defamation is "an invasion of the interest in repu-
tation and good name, by communication to others which tends to
diminish the esteem in which the plaintiff is held."' 2' The mode of
communication-oral or written-has produced a dichotomy in, and
confusion of, defamation law which legal scholars have attacked
unremittingly.2 An oral defamatory remark is denominated slander;
a written remark of this character is termed libel. At common law it
was necessary in slander actions to prove actual damages of a pecuni-
ary nature ("special damages"), unless there was an imputation of:
(1) a serious crime; (2) certain loathsome diseases; (3) matters
affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession or office; or
(4) in some jurisdictions, unchastity to a woman. 23 On the other hand,
historically it was never required that special damages be proved in
libel actions.2 4 It remains a requirement of both actions that the re-
marks be made known to persons other than the plaintiff, i.e., that
they be "published. ' ; 5
Unless credit is necessary for the debtor in his business, or his repu-
tation for honesty is essential in his calling,26 an oral publication that
20. Prosser § 100, at 668.
21. Prosser § 92, at 572.
22. E.g., Green, Essays on Tort and Crime 49 (1933); 8 Holdsworth, History
of English Law 333-36 (1925); Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law
427-45 (2d ed. 1936); Fisher, The History of the Law of Libel, 10 Law Q. Rev.
158 (1894); Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 Colum. L.
Rev. 546 (1903).
23. Prosser § 93.
24. Id. at 587.
25. Prosser § 94, at 596-97.
26. The plaintiff must be affected directly in his business, trade, occupation or
profession. See Prosser § 93, at 590-91. In Liebel v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
103 Mont. 370, 62 P.2d 667 (1936), the court held that the fact that a stenographer
does not pay her debts does not injure her in her occupation as a stenographer.
This category of slander, in addition to the other three, exists for the purpose
of permitting a plaintiff in slander actions to recover without proof of special
damages. The trade or business category has been discussed in connection with
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one owes a debt, or that he is a "deadbeat," must, in addition to
imputing dishonesty, give rise to special, i.e., pecuniary, damages. In
Tuyes 'v. Chambers,27 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant called
her a "deadbeat" and asserted that she was "no lady." This communi-
cation was made to plaintiff at the corner grocery store. The remarks
were also made to plaintiff's daughter. Plaintiff was unable to prove
that the remarks to her were overheard, and they were thus unpub-
lished, but the communication to the daughter was found to have been
a slanderous publication. The theory upon which liability was based is
not clear from the opinion as the case also involved libelous conduct.
However, it was suggested that mental anguish would have been suffi-
cient as special damages if slander alone had been present.28 Since
mental anguish is not pecuniary in nature it is submitted that most
jurisdictions would not allow recovery for slander in such an instance.
If written words communicated to another tend to create hatred,
contempt or ridicule of the plaintiff, or lower the esteem in which he
is held, recovery may be had in an action of libel. Words that are
"libelous on their face" 29 and result in harm to the plaintiff's reputa-
tion, require no proof of special damages; but those words which re-
quire proof of extrinsic facts to disclose their libelous meaninglo may
libel actions by a few courts, apparently because these courts now require that
special damages be proved when the communication is not "libelous on its face";
thus such communications are treated as slander with respect to the special
damages requirement. See text supported by notes 29-31 infra. See also Holtz
v. National Furniture Co., 57 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Stannard v. Wilcox &
Gibbs Sewing Mach. Co., 118 Md. 151, 84 At. 335 (1912).
27. 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919).
28. Id. at 731, 81 So. at 267.
29. "Libelous on their face" is used here rather than more common terms
such as "libelous per se," or "actionable per se." Courts have used these terms in
differing senses, and much confusion of meaning has resulted. See Note, 1957
Wash. U.L.Q. 358, 364 ("Authorities disagree which common law term pre-
cipitated the confusion, but they agree that misunderstood terminology was the
ultimate cause."); Comment, 43 Geo. L.J. 537 (1955).
30. This is generally referred to as "libelous per quod"; in such cases one
must plead the "inducement" (facts which make the words libelous), the
"innuendo" (libelous meaning of the words revealed by the inducement), and
the "colloquium" (a showing that the words refer to plaintiff). See Prosser,
§ 92, at 579-84; Note, 1957 Wash. U.L.Q. at 361.
The defendant's alleged conduct was so extreme in Thompson v. Adelberg &
Berman, Inc., 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (1918), that the court had little difficulty
in unveiling the libelous character of the publication. The petition stated that
defendant in order to collect an $8.95 debt: "came upon her [plaintiff's] home
grounds, in her use and occupation, and placed numerous yellow cards in the
apertures and crevices of the front door of her residence .... also in the windows
in the dining room... and the front room windows... and the windows on
the railroad side, and in the dining room windows in the rear yard, and placed
one in a stick which was driven in a flower mound about two feet from the
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in many jurisdictions necessitate proof of special damages', Creditors
often publish the existence of a debt by some form of written commu-
nication but frequently escape liability because of the debtor's inability
to plead and prove either the libelous character of such communication
or special damages. For example, in Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye
Fuel & Warehouse Co., 32 defendant circulated in plaintiff's community
handbills of flaming orange color on which plaintiff's debt of $4.32
was advertised for sale. The handbill did not show the period of time
the debt had been outstanding, which fact would bear on the inference
of dishonesty. In deciding for defendant the court stated: "No special
damages are alleged in the complaint so that to constitute a cause of
action for libel the matter published must be libelous per se.' '33 The
court was unable to draw an imputation of dishonesty from the hand-
bill in question.
Since courts are often loath to infer a charge of dishonesty from
the publication of a debt, even though it is delinquent, creditors thus
are shielded further against liability for improper collection methods
in defamation actions. The court in Muetze v. Tuteur34 drew such an
inference when the defendant association sent to the plaintiff two
conspicuous envelopes of red paper, in addition to others, with the
following markings on their face:
Return in twenty days to . ...
an organization of business and professional men
FOR COLLECTING BAD DEBTS
In addition to finding that the defendants had engaged in conduct
calculated to coerce payment of the debt, the court reasoned that the
"words imputed to the plaintiff a bad character, and a want of credit,
which implied that he was a cheat and a swindler."' 5 A closer question
of the inference permissible from a creditor's communication is found
sidewalk on the Lincoln Avenue side, which cards read in large type, and each
word in capital initial letters 'Please Take Notice,' and then in larger capital
letters 'OUR COLLECTOR,' and then in smaller letters 'was here for payment.'
'We would save you the annoyance of his further calls, if you will pay at the
store.' Then, in large capital letters, 'THE UNION CLOTHING STORE."'
Id. at 488, 205 S.W. at 558-59.
31. See Prosser § 93, at 587-88.
32. 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936).
33. Id. at 517, 269 N.W. at 298.
34. 77 Wis. 236, 46 N.W. 123 (1890).
35. Id. at 244, 46 N.W. at 125. In State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395, 16 S.W.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1959/iss4/3
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in the recent case of Stickle v. Trimmer." Here, defendant sent a
letter to plaintiff's employer. After soliciting the employer's coopera-
tion in adjusting the alleged delinquent debts, the letter continued:
"For some time we have endeavored, without success, to secure his
[plaintiff's] cooperation. If he continues to ignore this obligation our
customer may elect to use more drastic measures." 37 The trial court
submitted the issue to the jury, and verdict and judgment were ren-
dered for plaintiff. On appeal, the judgment was sustained, but the
court closely examined the fact-finder's inference from the above-
quoted portion of the creditor's letter. It concluded that "while a non-
defamatory meaning could also be reasonably derived from the letter
-that plaintiff merely was unable to pay-there was enough support
for the more invidious inference in the entirety of the proofs to make
the question as to how it was understood by the addressee an issue for
the fact-finder." 38
Another manner in which injury may occur to a debtor's reputation
is the giving of false information about the debtor by a mercantile
credit reporting agency to one of its subscribers. These agencies are
accorded a "qualified privilege" and, except when malice or abuse is
shown, are generally successful in defending against defamation ac-
604 (1891), the defendant was found guilty of criminal libel when he caused the
following envelope to be sent to the debtor's place of employment:
BAD DEBT Chicago, Ills.
Collecting Agency March 26, U. s.
218 La Salle St., 6:30 P.M. Postage
Chicago R. R. Stamp.
[name of debtor]
c/o Scruggs, Vandervoort & Barney,
[debtor's home address] St. Louis, Mo.
36. 50 N.J. Super. 518, 143 A.2d 1 (App. Div. 1958).
37. Id. at 521, 143 A.2d at 2.
38. Id. at 525, 143 A.2d at 4. Creditors were also held liable in libel actions
for sending letters to employers in Holt v. Boyle Bros. Inc., 217 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir.
1954); Keating v. Conviser, 246 N.Y. 632, 159 N.E. 680 (1927), reversing 127
Misc. 531, 217 N.Y. Supp. 117 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Neaton v. Lewis Apparel Stores,
267 App. Div. 728, 48 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1944). Contra, Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind.
App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948); Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, Inc.,
345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1956).
A creditor was held liable under the "republication" doctrine when a libelous
letter sent by him to debtor's employer was exhibited before a promotion board
thirteen months after its original receipt, the one year statute of limitation on
the original publication having run. Weaver v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 199 Va. 196,
98 S.E.2d 687 (1957), noted, 43 Va. L. Rev. 1132 (1957).
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tions.39 A different rule exists for mutual credit information associa-
tions-organizations composed of local merchants who wish to reduce
their credit risks by reporting to each other the names of delinquent
debtors, from whom credit is then withheld mandatorily by all. If,
through mistake' or efforts designed to coerce payment of a debt,
41
the debtor's reputation is injured, both creditor and association are
exposed to potential liability.
The defense of truth may also limit a debtor's right to recover in a
defamation action. But even though a communication that one owes
a debt is true, if a false imputation of dishonesty is found therein, or
if the truthful statement regarding the existence of the debt is used
maliciously or to coerce payment, then an action in defamation may
lie, the truth notwithstanding.42
General confusion in existing defamation law, the requirements of
publication and special damages, the inference which must be drawn
from the communication, and the defenses of qualified privilege and
truth, all combine to render libel and slander actions highly unreliable
as possible avenues for recovery by injured debtors.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The theory of a tort action for an invasion of one's right of privacy
originated in 1890.43 Today it is accepted in over twenty states,44
Missouri included, 45 and is specifically rejected in only three.46 The
right now seems to encompass four distinct categories of activity :4
(1) an intrusion into one's physical solitude; (2) a publishing of that
which violates the ordinary decencies; (3) a placing of one in a false
but not necessarily defamatory position in the eyes of the public; and
(4) an appropriation of a part of one's personality for commercial
use.
39. See Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies.-Macintosh
v. Dunn, 14 Colum. L. Rev. 187 (1914); Note, 2 De Paul L. Rev. 69 (1952);
Note, 11 S.C.L.Q. 256 (1959); Comment, 9 S.C.L.Q. 291 (1957).
40. E.g., J. Hartman & Co. v. Hyman, 287 Pa. 78, 134 Atl. 486 (1926).
41. E.g., Werner v. Vogeli, 10 Kan. App. 536, 63 Pac. 607 (1901); Traynor
v. Seiloff, 62 Minn. 420, 64 N.W. 915 (1895); Masters v. Lee, 39 Neb. 574, 58
N.W. 222 (1894); Woodhouse v. Powles, 43 Wash. 617, 86 Pac. 1063 (1906);
Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N.W. 123 (1890).
42. See Prosser § 96, at 630-31. See also Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 326-27,
167 N.W. 584, 586 (1918), in which the defense of truth regarding the publication
of the existence of a debt is discussed.
43. This action was first proposed in a law review article. Warren & Brandeis,
The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
44. See Prosser § 97, at 636.
45. See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911).
46. Prosser § 97, at 637.
47. Id. at 637-39.
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The physical intrusion category covers two-party situations in
which a creditor might, for example, continuously and at late hours
call the debtor. An action for defamation would fail in such a situa-
tion, for there is a lack of the necessary publication,48 yet some cases
would allow recovery based on violation of the debtor's right of
privacy.49
The majority of collection cases brought on this theory involve not
physical intrusion, but rather an alleged publishing of that which
violates the ordinary decencies. A debtor is faced here with the same
publication requirement to prove an invasion of his right of privacy
as is necessary under the theory of defamation. The types of activi-
ties held actionable for invasion of privacy have included the voicing
of loud, degrading remarks at the debtor's place of employment,"1 the
telephoning of a debtor at his friend's home or his place of employ-
ment,52 the placing of signs or bill-boards in shop windows advertising
the debt,53 and the publication of the debt in newspapers and maga-
zines. 54
The case of Brents v. Morgan,55 presents a classic illustration of the
invasion of a debtor's right of privacy by an overzealous creditor.
The defendant-creditor placed a sign in the front window of his garage
which stated: Notice
[Name of debtor] owes an
account here of $49.67.
And if promises would pay
an account this account
would have been
settled long ago. This
account will be advertised
as long as it remains
unpaid.5 r
48. See text supported by note 25 supra.
49. See, e.g., Hush v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 85, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
50. Prosser § 97, at 641. This requirement does not apply to the "physical
intrusion" situations.
51. See, e.g., Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo.
1959).
52. In Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950), a
telephone call to a neighbor's home was considered as one factor. Although the
opinion was based on an intentional causing of mental disturbance, the court
stated that there was also an invasion of the debtor's right of privacy. See also
Hush v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956) (telephone calls to debtor's
place of employment as one factor).
53. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
54. Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
55. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
56. Id. at 766, 299 S.W. at 968.
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This is a clear example of a publication of that which violates ordi-
nary decencies, and accordingly was held actionable in right of
privacy.
In less clear cases, however, recovery often may be thwarted be-
cause of substantial limitations which courts have placed upon this
theory. Many jurisdictions hold that the action must be based on
written communications." For that matter, the right of privacy
theory was not originally designed to cover oral communications.53
A few jurisdictions have now adopted the more liberal view that even
though communications are wholly oral an action for invasion of
privacy may lie.-, In the recent case of Biederman's of Springfield,
Inc. v. Wright,60 the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that a counterclaim
based on an alleged violation of a debtor's right of privacy stated a
cause of action though all of the communications involved were oral.
An additional limitation upon the theory lies in the fact that merely
giving notice to an employer of a debt owed by an employee, or solicit-
ing an employer's help in collecting a debt, is not sufficient as a basis
for recovery in right of privacy.,1 A further limitation, and perhaps
the broadest of all, is that the action lies only in cases in which the
creditor's conduct is serious and outrageous.6 2 The rationale support-
ing this is that there are some annoyances which must be suffered
without legal redress if courts are to be uncluttered and able to dis-
patch justice rapidly in the more serious cases. Also, this limitation
is felt to be a deterrent against manufactured claims motivated by the
57. See, e.g., Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d
267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947) (holding telephone calls provided no basis for an action
in right of privacy).
58. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 217 (1890).
59. See, e.g., Bowden v. Spiegel, 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950).
60. 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959). It is apparent that oral communications of an
abusive nature can have just as much damaging effect on a debtor's reputation or
tranquility as can abusive written material. Courts which do not recognize an
action based upon right of privacy where only oral communications are present,
and which further do not recognize the intentional causing of mental disturbance
as a separate tort (see text at notes 67-78 infra), allow large areas of unreason-
able collection conduct to escape legal redress. It is submitted that the intentional
causing of mental disturbance is better adapted to cover such communications;
but if this theory is unacceptable, a decision allowing recovery in right of privacy
for oral communications certainly would be preferable to a decision denying any
redress for the injury.
61. See, e.g., Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind. App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948). See
also Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, Inc., 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835
(1956), in which the employer's aid was solicited.
62. See, e.g., Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d
225 (1950), in which it is stated that "there are some shocks, inconveniencies
and annoyances which members of society in the nature of things must absorb
without the right of redress." Id. at 711, 57 S.E.2d at 227.
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substantial judgments which are sometimes given for mental pain
alone.
63
That the right of privacy theory may give a debtor some advantages
over an action based on defamation is not denied. Truth is not a de-
fense to this action,64 and malice or the lack thereof is immaterial.-6
Further, proof of special damages is not required,66 nor need physical
injury occur. Still, despite these advantages, the right of privacy
theory obviously leaves much to to be desired both in scope and force
when applied to today's range of "rough collection" controversies.
INTENTIONAL CAUSING OF MENTAL DISTURBANCE
As a separate tort, intentional causing of mental disturbance is of
rather recent origin, and has had relatively limited application in the
courts.6" Early cases68 allowed recovery only if this action was linked
with traditionally recognized torts such as defamation, abuse of pro-
cess, or assault. 9 Today, courts which recognize the intentional caus-
ing of mental disturbance as a separate tort limit it to conduct of
extreme or flagrant nature.70 As a general rule, it may now be stated
that no physical harm is required when a defendant's acts constitute
an intentional causing of the plaintiff's mental disturbance, though
physical injury is deemed essential if the conduct constitutes only a
negligent causing of mental disturbance.71 Courts, however, will care-
fully examine cases of the former class, in which no physical injury is
present.7 2 Any hesitancy to allow recovery in such cases stems from
the fear that counts will become overcrowded with fictitious claims.
This, of course, has some validity, but to deny justifiable claims be-
cause of such fear tacitly discredits the courts' fact-finding process.
This tort action is still in an early stage of growth. The question of
exactly where the line should be drawn between trivial insult and out-
63. Prosser § 97, at 641.
64. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
65. Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177
P.2d 896 (1947). See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
66. In Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892, 898 (Mo.
1959), the court stated that "pleading the falsity of the charges and special
damages... are rendered unnecessary."
67. See Prosser § 11.
68. The first cases allowing recovery under this theory involved insults made
to passengers by common carrier employees. Ibid.
69. See Borda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquility, 28 Geo.
L.J. 55 (1939).
70. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40, 53 (1956).
71. The Restatement of Torts has now specifically rejected physical harm as
an essential to an action for the intentional causing of mental disturbance. Re-
statement, Torts § 46 (Supp. 1948).
72. Ibid.
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rageous or flagrant abuse presents a major problem. As under other
theories, a defendant will not be held liable for doing nothing more
than using reasonable efforts to collect a debt. Bad manners alone will
not sustain the action. But, as in the case of Digsby v. Carroll Baking
Co.," when a creditor goes beyond the line of legitimate and reason-
able effort, and in fact becomes grossly abusive and threatening, lia-
bility has been found. The remark made by the defendant in the
Digsby case was both abusive and extreme-he told a pregnant debtor
that if he could not get payment in any other way he would "take it
out in trade."4
Another example of conduct sufficient to constitute extreme or
flagrant abuse appears in the case of Gadburg v. Bleitz.75 In this case
an undertaker delayed the cremation of the body of the debtor's son,
attempting in this way to secure payment of a past due account. The
debtor at the time thought that her son's body had already been cre-
mated. When informed that it had not been, and further that it would
not be until payment was made, the debtor-mother suffered great
mental shock. The court allowed recovery stating that in this instance
there was no need for physical injury since the acts of the creditor
were both wilful and extreme.
A perusal of the cases reveals that the particular type of debtor
involved has important bearing on the question of extremeness. This is
evidenced by the multitude of cases allowing recovery by female plain-
tiffs, more particularly pregnant and widowed plaintiffs.76 The reason
for this is that the sensibilities of such plaintiffs differ considerably
from those of persons of stronger make-up. As a correlative of this
factor, the type of defendant involved is also given at least implicit
consideration. Professional collection agencies appear to be viewed
more critically than either corporate or non-corporate business credi-
tors.77 In addition, though a single act may be serious enough to sat-
isfy "extremeness," the repetition of a less aggravating act or the
combination of this with other abusive acts will weigh heavily toward
the satisfaction of this requirement.7 8 Though the question of extreme-
ness presents some difficulty, it seems safe to state that the intentional
73. 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948).
74. Id. at 657, 47 S.E.2d at 205.
75. 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925).
76. See, e.g., Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203
(1948) (pregnant debtor). For a discussion of this factor, see Prosser, Inten-
tional Infliction of Mental Suffering, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 888 (1939).
77. See Note, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 572, 585 (1957). See also Wade, Tort
Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 63, 72 (1950).
78. It is evident from a reading of the cases that collectors often use a
combination of techniques in attempting collection of debts.
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causing of mental disturbance in its particular application to "rough
collection" cases is a rapidly growing area of the law.
CONCLUSION
The vast majority of cases have involved debts of comparatively
small amounts.7 9 The reason for this is that when greater sums are
involved creditors are more prone to resort to judicial machinery.
It should be noted further that quite frequently the debts involved
in the "rough collection" cases have been disputed. 0 Courts seldom
have adverted expressly to this fact in deciding the cases. But the fact
of good faith dispute, especially when evidenced by tender or part pay-
ment, should have, and in a few cases implicitly has had,81 some bear-
ing on the ultimate question of the creditor's liability.
The one common factor present in practically all cases in this area
is conduct calculated to coerce payment of the debt. In the area of
defamation courts denominate the interest protected from such coer-
cion as that of "reputation"; in the area of right of privacy the
interests protected are those of "physical solitude" and "freedom
from that which violates common decencies"; and the interest pro-
tected by the theory of intentional causing of mental disturbance is
"mental tranquility." It is submitted that the primary interest
underlying all of these areas is the debtor's right of freedom from
unreasonable invasions of his mental tranquility. Since the theory of
intentional causing of mental disturbance protects this underlying
interest it is believed to be the most appropriate theory for the many
and varied situations in the "rough collection" area.
The present law as applied to "rough collection" cases is impreg-
nated with technicality and confusion, and varies greatly among juris-
dictions. A uniform theory of tort liability would do much to add both
consistency and predictability to collection cases. Clearly, there are
many activities engaged in by creditors which result in mental dis-
turbance, yet recovery is denied because the facts alleged do not "state
a cause of action. 382 In the two-party situations defamation will not lie
without publication, and although an action in right of privacy might
be allowed, it often fails if the communication is oral. The action for
intentional causing of mental disturbance suffers neither of these
limitations. As Professor Prosser has indicated, as acceptance of this
theory spreads, it may easily supplant other existing remedies in this
79. See Note, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 572, 585. In only a very few cases did the
debt exceed $100.
80. See, e.g., Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236, 46 N.W. 123 (1890).
81. See, e.g., Werner v. Vogeli, 10 Kan. App. 536, 63 Pac. 607 (1901).
82. See text supported by notes 48, 49 supra.
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area.-3 It is suggested, therefore, that in order to recover, the debtor
should be required only to plead and prove conduct which: (1) was
intentionally abusive; (2) was extreme; and (3) caused injury,
whether mental, physical, or both.
83. Prosser § 11. "When the 'new tort' of the intentional infliction of mental
suffering becomes fully developed and receives general recognition, the great
majority of the privacy cases may very possibly be absorbed into it." Id. at 639.
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